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LOWELL DITTMER AND BAOGANG HE
Introduction: Australia’s Strategic Dilemma
IN THE PAST 20 YEARS, CHINA HAS RISEN to become the second largest
economic power in the world. Its GDP surpassed that of Canada in 1993,
Italy in 2000, France in 2005, the U.K. in 2006, Germany in 2008, and Japan
in 2009. In 2012 it surpassed the United States as the world’s largest trading
nation (the U.S. remains the largest importer). China is now the number one
trading partner of Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the ﬁrst or second
trading partner of the 10 nations in the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), not counting the EU. Growing economic dependence
upon China, however, raises long-term security issues for all Asian trade
partners, given their strategic proximity to ambitious China. This is also true
for Australia, just 200 kilometers from Indonesia at their closest points.
Canberra, unable to shore up a security guarantee from Beijing, has increased
its purchase in the security insurance policies of Washington.
It is interesting to note that in the Asia Paciﬁc a bilateral relationship often
turns into a trilateral relationship. China’s bilateral relationship with Australia
has evolved into a triangular relationship with the U.S. Similarly, China’s
bilateral relations with Japan, South Korea, Singapore, the Philippines, and
Vietnam have evolved into triangular relations as well. Typically, this exhibits
a pattern in which the middle or small country relies on the U.S. for its
security, while it is heavily dependent upon China for its trade and economic
growth. This raises the issue of the relationship between economic growth
and military power. It would seem they are not directly commensurable, but
they are clearly linked, in both the short term (e.g., trade relations can
suddenly be cut off) and the long (i.e., a nation’s military power derives from
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its economic capability). A small or middle power is caught between these
two major powers in the sense that both Beijing and Washington have claims
to deﬁne the core national interests of a small or middle power and pull it in
opposite directions.
The larger issue is, how does a middle or small power avoid a hard choice
between two larger and stronger ones? Two main scenarios have emerged in
the ongoing debate. The most pessimistic view is that at some point in the
future Australia will be forced to make a ‘‘hard choice’’ between the U.S. and
China. A more optimistic scenario is one in which Australia functions as
a bridge or go-between, providing the U.S. with useful ideas about how to
respond to China’s rise, and in this way has an active and positive inﬂuence
on the relationship while enhancing its own prosperity and security. The
evolution of Australian political thinking on this issue is covered in the article
by Colin Mackerras, while Baogang He reviews the academic literature.
There has also been policy debate in China about this issue, as insightfully
reviewed by Weihua Liu and Yufan Hao. Two different schools of thought
seem to be emerging: one view, as expressed by former President Hu Jintao,
holds that ‘‘Australia can be inﬂuenced’’ and its alliance with the U.S. weak-
ened. A second view holds that the Australia-U.S. alliance is so strong that
any attempt on China’s part to undermine it would be a waste of time. In the
U.S., in contrast, there has been little academic or public discussion of this
issue. This Special Issue of Asian Survey, stemming from an international
Fulbright Symposium convoked by Professor Baogang He in August 2011 at
Deakin University in Melbourne, represents the ﬁrst time leading scholars
from Australia, the United States, and China have come together to discuss
the future of the Australia-U.S. alliance in the context of the rise of China.
The issue aims at deepening mutual understanding between Australia, the
U.S., and China; facilitating better management of the trilateral relation-
ship; and helping to avoid potentially dangerous misunderstandings in the
future.
First, trilateralism has multiple dimensions of deﬁnitions. During the Cold
War, trilateralism referred to ‘‘the political and economic policy of encour-
aging friendly relations among three nations or regions, especially the United
States, Western Europe, and Japan, or North America, Europe, and the
Paciﬁc Rim.’’1 The ﬁrst Trilateral Commission was founded in July 1973 to
1. Freedictionary.com, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/trilateralism>, accessed June 20, 2011.
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foster closer cooperation among the U.S., Europe, and Japan.2 There is now
a new form of trilateralization emerging that is driven by relations between
a rising China, the U.S., and Australia. This form of trilateralism does not
have a formal trilateral institutional structure: the parties involved largely
engage each other in bilateral terms. This begs the question whether some
form of institutionalized trilateralism is needed to manage conﬂict and pro-
mote cooperation. Trilateralism is thus a goal, an optimal arrangement of
relations with normative implications. In this context, it represents Canberra’s
effort to develop a cooperative trilateral relationship with a rising power (sc.,
China) and a relatively declining ‘‘hegemon’’ (the U.S.).
But the above understanding of trilateralism does not encompass all the
possible relations that might arise. A more comprehensive and open-ended
framework, clearly set forth by Liu and Hao below, is that of the ‘‘strategic
triangle.’’3 Within any set of three actors, assuming their relations may be
positive or negative and are bilaterally requited, there are but four possible
conﬁgurations: a ‘‘marriage’’ of two against one, a ‘‘romantic triangle’’ in
which one has good relations with the other two who have mutually negative
relations, a ‘‘unit-veto’’ triangle in which all relations are negative, and a
‘‘me´nage a` trois,’’ in which all relations are positive. The deﬁning feature is
that each bilateral relationship is also affected by relations with a third party.
Thus, trilateralism can be nested within a strategic triangle as a normative
model moving toward an inclusive positive outcome––a ‘‘me´nage.’’
Formally speaking, however, it is not the current conﬁguration. The cur-
rent conﬁguration is a ‘‘marriage’’ or security alliance between Australia and
the U.S. It is not explicitly directed against any third power, but it does not
include China. Understandably, this makes China somewhat uneasy. Chi-
nese spokespersons have sometimes groused that efforts to strengthen the
alliance ‘‘play China for a fool,’’ or have even criticized the alliance itself (this,
however, was later disavowed). The nature, scope, and limits of the
Australian-American defense alliance in the context of booming Sino-
Australian trade relations are exhaustively explored here by Bill Tow. The
2. Wikipedia.org, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trilateral_Commission>, accessed June 20, 2011.
3. Cf. Lowell Dittmer, ‘‘The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game Theoretical Analysis,’’
World Politics 33:4 (July 1981), pp. 485–516; also anthologized in Klaus Knorr, ed., Power, Strategy, and
Security: A World Politics Reader (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 37–68; and
Lowell Dittmer, ‘‘Sino-Australian Relations: A Triangular Perspective,’’ Australian Journal of Political
Science 47:4 (December 2012), pp. 661–77.
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alliance has potential costs as well as beneﬁts (both to the viability of the
alliance and to Australia’s national security interests), and Australian prime
ministers have varied along a continuumbetween the ‘‘deputy sheriff’’ position
of loyal adherence (as in the Howard, Rudd, and Gillard administrations) and
a more neutral or conditional commitment (as in the Hawke-Keating era).
One point of divergence hinges on the Taiwan issue (does Australia’s com-
mitment include Taiwan? or does the alliance only come into play when either
of the two alliance partners’ security interests are threatened, as in former
Foreign Minister Alexander Downing’s interpretation), but Canberra has also
differed with Washington over Suez, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Those advo-
cating greater independence from the alliance argue not only in terms of
appeasing Beijing, thoughChina’s recent andmassive growth surge is certainly
a factor, but also in terms of the advantages of Australia’s greater integration
with Asia. This so-called ‘‘middle power diplomacy’’ conceives of Australia and
other such middle powers organizing a multilateral position between the two
superpowers. This notion dovetails with HughWhite’s controversial proposal
for an Asian ‘‘concert of powers’’ that would ‘‘enmesh’’ the two superpowers in
a multilateral web and thereby play down the rivalry between them.
For middle power diplomacy to be a viable option presupposes that
Australia shares interests with a group of such powers. It is true, as noted,
that Australia in common with a number of Asian middle powers (Indonesia,
Vietnam, Korea, Japan) has since the turn of the millennium developed
thriving trade ties with China while maintaining security relations with the
U.S. Yet, if we look more closely, we see differences as well. Australia’s
security relationship with China, if the Taiwan (and perhaps the Korean)
issue can for the moment be disregarded, is largely untroubled, in contrast to
Japan’s and that of many Southeast Asian nations who have disputes with
China over sovereignty claims in the East and South China Seas, respectively.
‘‘Australia is the only Western power without any direct strategic conﬂicts
with China in the region,’’ in Derek McDougall’s words. At the same time, it
is probably no secret that Australia’s security policies, like those of the U.S.,
are implicitly oriented (inter alia) to a China contingency. This comes
through fairly clearly in Chad Ohlandt’s informative discussion of coopera-
tion in space, where he ﬁnds that collaboration is mostly bilateral in ‘‘all three
space arenas, civil, commercial, and military.’’
Economically, too, Australia’s trade relations are quite distinctive. Actu-
ally, all China’s trade with its Asian partners is asymmetrical, simply because
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China is the largest trading nation in the world, and in that sense each
bilateral relationship is smaller and less signiﬁcant to China than to its trade
partners. Yet, as Nick Bisley points out, three other aspects of the trade rela-
tionship offset Australia’s trade dependency. The terms of Sino-Australian
trade are in Australia’s favor, generating a large foreign exchange surplus.
Second, although the trade is essentially ‘‘neocolonial’’ (Australia exports raw
materials and imports manufactures), the substitutability of Australian exports
(mostly iron ore and coal) is low—China can buy elsewhere, but only at
a higher price or for lower quality. Third, while China has become Australia’s
largest trade partner, China’s FDI has lagged behind—mainly due to Can-
berra’s caution.
Meanwhile, Australia faces the same issues of substitutability and relative
cost with regard to security. Canberra has never had a Yoshida Doctrine per
se, but as junior partner in the U.S. alliance, Australia has derived many
beneﬁts over the years including extended nuclear deterrence, enhanced naval
force projection, information collaboration, and reduced defense budgets. In
space and high-tech weapons development as in other security domains,
Ohlandt makes clear, Australia’s relationship with the U.S. is stronger than
most, indeed, it is one of the oldest and strongest of the ﬁve U.S.-Asian
bilateral security alliances. For Australia to either follow New Zealand’s lead
and abrogate the alliance, or just informally de-emphasize it in the interest of
greater engagement in middle power diplomacy (and to appease Beijing)
would entail ‘‘a much more serious approach to defense policy than any
Australian government has taken for a generation,’’ in White’s estimate.
A much higher level of defense spending would be required to give Australia
any weight in the new Asia. Yet, the choice may not be Canberra’s—as the
U.S. continues its relative political-economic decline, it may opt to push its
allies out of the nest, in a replay of Nixon’s Guam Doctrine. Analogous
bilateral high-tech military collaboration has yet to take off between Beijing
and either Canberra or Washington, according to Ohlandt.
From Australia’s perspective, relations with the two key great powers in its
arena are cause for concern because they are out of balance: the relationship
with China is essentially economic while relations with the U.S. focus on
security. And the sense is that security relations outweigh economic rela-
tions. This gives rise to PRC resentment, especially as the trend-line points
to the continued burgeoning of trade with China. One way of resolving
this is to take the liberal position that economics and politics are separate,
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that Sino-Australian business is politically and strategically neutral. This
accords with China’s principled position throughout much of the reform era,
but since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has increasingly resorted to trade
sanctions as a tool of political coercion (usually enforcing U.N. Security
Council resolutions). In the past few years, Beijing has followed suit, as in the
2010 embargo on rare earth elements or the 2012 boycotts of Philippine
bananas or Japanese automobiles. To preclude this eventuality (however
remote, given the terms of trade), Australian political leaders have sought to
minimize any seeming inconsistencies between economic and security ties.
Some have even vowed that Australia will not enforce ANZUS provisions if
they conﬂict withChinese interests (as, for example, in aTaiwan contingency).
Washington has resisted this tendency to tailor the alliance to ﬁt Beijing’s
preferences.
And which Chinese preferences might conceivably conﬂict with ANZUS?
Liu and Hao relate that since the 17th Party Congress in 2007, Beijing has
sought to formulate its ‘‘core interests’’ in three terms: ﬁrst, the stability of
the Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership and the socialist system;
second, sovereign territorial integrity and national uniﬁcation; and third,
China’s sustainable economic and social development. Stated in the abstract,
neither Canberra nor Washington takes exception to any of these core
interests—indeed, President Obama explicitly agreed with them in his initial
2009 visit to China. But China’s empirical deﬁnition of its maritime terri-
torial boundaries overlaps those of many of its neighbors, and since around
2009 China has become more assertive in attempting to enforce these claims.
Underlying the three core interests is an even more long-standing goal: to
restore China’s regional national primacy—not as a ‘‘hegemon,’’ but as a
‘‘great power of a new type.’’ Stubbornly opposing this goal in many Chinese
eyes has been the hegemonic power of the U.S. On the American side, despite
recurrent rhetorical denials of any ‘‘China threat theory’’ in which the U.S.
seeks to thwart China’s rise, China’s growth surge has inspired ‘‘power tran-
sition’’ anxiety.4 This creates what Gilbert Rozman calls a ‘‘national identity
gap’’ between China and the U.S., as reﬂected in polarizing media rhetoric and
4. This is a theory ﬁrst articulated by Organski in 1958 but most recently applied to the China case
by Mearsheimer. It posits that major war is most likely to break out during the period when a rising
power approaches the capabilities of an established major power. See A. F. K. Organski,World Politics
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958); and John J. Mearsheimer, ‘‘The Gathering Storm: China’s
Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia,’’ Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2010), pp. 381–96.
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nationalistic public opinion. The exact points of friction between these two
national identities are quite vague (e.g., Chinese communism has been eclec-
tically modiﬁed in the course of reform to make it more economically efﬁ-
cient), but lurking behind them historically and perhaps still reinforcing their
driving power is an old ideological antithesis between communism and
democracy. Australia shares this ideological antithesis but, not being a regional
hegemon, does not share theAmerican self-assigned responsibility to police the
status quo, and the PRC hence does not blame it quite so much for trying to
inhibit its rise. Still, some Chinese commentators have warned that many
Australians have mistaken views of China’s grand strategy that could damage
bilateral relations.5
The democracy shared by Australia, the U.S., and other Asian nations
poses another dilemma for China. If its democratization process stalls or
regresses, China faces further moral isolation that deepens divisions between
itself and the increasingly democratic Asian community. On the other hand,
genuine democratization undermines CCP control. As a result of this dilemma,
China has pursued a slow and reversible process of democratization. Thus,
‘‘democracy with Chinese characteristics,’’ like Russian democracy under Putin,
is apt to remain quite different from democratic practice in the U.S. or Australia
for some time. This poses the challenging question: can Washington and
Canberra learn to accept the legitimacy of Chinese power and its political
system?
In terms of their attitudes to regionalism, the U.S. and Australia are also
closer to each other than to China. Australia has followed the American idea
of an Asian-Paciﬁc Region to construct institutional frameworks for regional
interaction (e.g., APEC, the TPP), while China has competed to push its own
preferred institutional mechanisms, such as ASEAN Plus Three, excluding
the U.S. and Australia. At the same time, China faces a regional dilemma, as
some members of ASEAN have attempted to mobilize pressure against Chi-
nese territorial claims. China’s growing participation in multilateral organiza-
tions involves both opportunities and risks. Regionalism can be both an
instrument for China to assume a more active and inﬂuential role in the
region as well as a constraint on its international behavior, making it difﬁcult
5. Yu Changsen, ‘‘Aodaliya dui Zhongguo jueqi de renzhi yu fanying’’ [Australian views and
reactions to China’s rise], Dangdai Ya Tai [Journal of Contemporary Asia-Paciﬁc Studies] 4 (2010),
pp. 129–42.
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for China to judge the extent to which participation in regional organizations
is strategically useful.
Australia’s attempt to build a peaceful and prosperous trilateral relation-
ship with a rising power and a relatively declining one is indeed challenging.
But it is an issue apt to confront many of its Asian neighbors as well, in each
case with its own nuances. This Asian Survey Special Issue, assembling the
best analyses of the Australian triangular dilemma, may thus have wider
regional relevance.
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